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MAKING PANCHAYATS CENTRAL TO RURAL DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF INDIRA AWAAS YOJANA (IAY)

H.S. Shylendra and S.S. Rajput

Introduction
There is an argument for strengthening the linkage between Centrally Sponsored Schemes (CSSs) and the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) to overcome some of the key problems faced by the former. While the issue of forging linkage between rural development and decentralisation has been advocated since long, the interface being newly sought to be established between CSSs and PRIs is the result of several challenges and compulsions that have emerged more recently. One of these challenges relates to bringing compatibility of CSSs in their present form with the framework of decentralisation created under the 73rd Constitutional Amendment. The CSSs which are generally formulated and implemented in a top-down manner contravene the constitutional provisions pertaining to the role of PRIs. The Eleventh Plan lamented that CSSs exist more as standalone interventions lacking integration and convergence with local governance. In a similar tone, the Expert Group on grassroots planning (2006) argued that CSSs are even coming in the way of real emergence of decentralized planning. In the process, the panchayats have been compelled to act merely as agents for channelizing CSS funds rather than emerge as empowered institutions for development planning. Further, with the economic reforms gaining grounds, the developmental programmes including CSSs have come under severe scrutiny. The Eleventh Plan called for radically altering the structure of CSSs by giving a pivotal role to local governments in their planning and implementation.

Several mechanisms have been identified to ensure centrality of panchayats under CSSs. A more instrumental way suggested is to modify the guidelines of various CSSs in consultation with the concerned ministries and departments to give a central role to PRIs in the planning and implementation of CSSs. Another suggestion is to make the release of central government funds conditional so that states are able to fulfil their obligations towards decentralisation. It is argued that CSSs can be leveraged to enforce states and their departments to devolve the needed functions and functionaries to panchayats so that they can play an active role. From a conceptual perspective, the linkage between CSSs and PRIs can be related to the perceived role of decentralisation for rural development as advocated either by the liberal interventionist approach or the radical populist approach. Under the liberal interventionist approach, the linkage could be seen as one of tapping decentralized institutions like PRIs more in an instrumental way for attaining efficient programme results. Decentralisation hence is considered to be an obvious choice for improving the efficiency of resource allocation of public programmes. From the perspective of radical populist approach, strengthening the linkage between CSSs and PRIs is seen as an attempt to transform structurally hierarchical system of planning which is politically and economically disempowering for the poor. Decentralisation done more in the form of devolution here becomes as an end in itself for empowering local communities. However, under both approaches outcomes of decentralisation are considered uncertain and predicated upon the existence of several desirable conditions.

Methodology: The present paper makes an attempt to look at critically some of the issues of linkage between CSSs and PRIs with special reference to Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY), a major CSS. The paper is part of a thematic study carried out under the ‘State of Panchayats Report 2008-09: An Independent Assessment’ by IRMA. The study tried to examine the nature and extent of the involvement of PRIs under six major CSSs, the progress towards assigning centrality to PRIs, and the emerging experiences and outcomes of the involvement of PRIs for decentralised planning and development?. The study was conducted in eight major states viz., Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Himachal Pradesh (HP), Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh (MP), Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu (TN). Data were collected at zilla panchayat (ZP), intermediate panchayat (IP), and village panchayat (VP) level. A relatively backward district was selected for a case study in each state to examine the role being played by PRIs.

Indira Awaas Yojana (IAY)
IAY launched during 1985-86 aims at providing houses to the poor in rural areas and is funded on a 75:25 cost-sharing basis between the Government of India and state governments. According to GOI guidelines (2004), the major target groups for houses under IAY are below poverty line households living in rural areas belonging to scheduled castes/scheduled tribes, freed bonded labourers and non-SC/ST BPL rural households, and widows. The objective is primarily to help construction/upgradation of dwelling units of members of the target groups by providing them financial assistance.

The Department of Rural Development under the Ministry of Rural Development is the apex body for overall implementation of IAY. At the state level, generally the department/s of rural development and panchayti raj look after IAY. A state level vigilance and monitoring committee for rural development programmes monitors the programme.

As per the GOI guidelines, the District Rural Development Agency (DRDA) and/or zilla panchayat (ZP) looks after the implementation of IAY at the district level. The ZP/DRDA on the basis of allocations made and targets fixed will decide the number of houses to be constructed panchayat-wise during a particular financial year. This will be intimated to the village panchayat (VP) concerned. Thereafter, the gram sabha will select the beneficiaries from the list of eligible BPL households restricting this number to the target allotted. The selection by the gram sabha is final and no approval by a higher body is required. ZP/DRDAs and the intermediate panchayat (IP) should however be sent a list of selected beneficiaries.

The ZP/DRDA concerned may certify that a particular category is exhausted or not available in a district so that these allocations may be utilized for other categories. IAY funds are operated by ZP/DRDA at the district level. The central government funds are released in two instalments subject to the progress of the scheme. The state government has to release its share to ZP/DRDA within a month. The beneficiary has to be involved in the construction of the house and can seek the help of ZP/DRDA in acquiring raw material at controlled rates. ZP/DRDA will not employ any contractors but can seek expertise or material help. ZP/DRDA has to ensure through monitoring completion of the previously sanctioned houses before seeking fresh allocations.

Role of Panchayats
IAY has been in existence since mid 1980s, and is standardized in terms of norms to ensure targeted and speedy release of funds from the state government to the VP level. The state governments implement the programme largely according to the guidelines issued by the central government with only minor deviations to suit local realities. The central government gives annual targets up to the district level. Attempts are being made to monitor the release of funds and implementation of the programme up to the household level using web-based technology. Officials at state government level in many of the states (Bihar, TN, HP, and Gujarat) are of the view that IAY has been streamlined well and the present system helps in the better implementation of IAY. They felt that the current role given for PRIs under IAY is adequate and there is no need for any further devolution. A few states not only have their own housing schemes (Gujarat, Karnataka, MP, and TN) but also make some additional allocation (Gujarat, Rajasthan and TN) to IAY households to meet the cost of housing.

ZP Level: As to whether it is DRDA or ZP which plays the key role depends upon the role assigned to ZP by the state government and also the status of DRDA in relation to ZP. In states like Karnataka, MP, and Rajasthan (where DRDA is merged with ZP), district level issues are handled by ZP. However, in Karnataka the final allocation across talukas and villages is done by a state level rural housing corporation which is the nodal agency for implementation of the scheme. In states like Assam, Bihar, TN and Gujarat, DRDAs have been assigned the role to handle district level issues. ZPs play no active role. In states like MP and HP where DRDA functions under ZP, ZP handles district level issues in co-ordination with DRDA. In MP and Rajasthan, ZPs have been given additional roles. In MP, ZP can exercise discretion up to 3 per cent in allotting houses to certain needy sections like widows and handicapped households. In HP, ZP ensures that at least two houses are allotted to each VP. In Rajasthan and MP, the chief executive officer (CEO) of ZP even releases funds directly to village panchayats/selected households at the village level. About the appeal for changing the status of Below Poverty Line (BPL), no role has been assigned to ZPs. In Bihar and Rajasthan the second appeal can be made to the District Collector for changing the status. In TN and Gujarat, DRDA authorities have been given the role in this regard. In TN, the consent of DRDA project officer is needed for the block development officer (BDO) to change the BPL status of a household on appeal. In all the states, ZPs overall monitor the progress of IAY. This is done mostly as a part of the review of all development programmes implemented in the district.

IP Level: The intermediate panchayats (IP) play a very limited role directly. IPs receive the list of selected BPL households from VPs. IPs may do only a general verification of the list before they pass it on to ZP/ DRDA. In MP, IPs verify the list to ensure that the roster has been followed in the allocation. The fund release is handled by BDO/TDO. In states like TN and HP, BDOs release funds to VPs. In Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, and Karnataka (till recently), BDOs released funds to beneficiaries directly. In some states, block level officials have been given additional powers. In TN, though VPs release funds to beneficiaries, the bank would release funds only on receiving advice from BDO. In Assam, the junior engineer at the block level is a joint signatory with the beneficiary for withdrawing money from the bank. IPs take up general monitoring of IAY mostly on a voluntary basis. Junior engineers (JE) and other technical people under IP provide technical supervision and advice (TN, Gujarat, Assam) to households to ensure quality and also provide utilization certificates (Rajasthan). In Gujarat, the IP president is a member of the land management committee which recommends land to landless IAY beneficiaries.

VP Level: In the given structure of IAY, VPs play relatively a more active role than ZP/IPs. They are the implementers of the programme at the village level. The BPL waitlist is supposed to approved by the gramsabha. Given the fact that the BPL list as prepared in 2002 has been faulty, VPs in some of the states are found proactively prioritizing the households based on actual need. VPs in many states (Gujarat, HP, Karnataka, TN, and MP) reported that they resort to such a change with approval from the gramsabha. This proactive role of VPs seems to be helping in mitigating the problems of the faulty BPL list.

In most states, houses are allotted only to households with a house site. In TN and Gujarat, VPs can recommend allotment of land to landless by higher level agencies. In terms of fund release, only a few states (TN, HP, and Karnataka) have allowed VPs to release funds to beneficiary households directly. Many states (Assam, Bihar, and Gujarat) release funds from district or block level directly to beneficiary households. In Karnataka, the state level rural housing corporation releases funds to VPs directly for release to beneficiary households.

Some of the states (Assam, Rajasthan) have reversed the system wherein the VP or VP president released funds to selected households. This has been done apparently with the intention of eliminating corruption at the VP level. In Karnataka, instead of IP, VP has now been entrusted with the role of disbursing funds in order to ensure better monitoring at the ground level. The same instrument of fund release is being perceived and utilized differently by different states as per their local reality for ensuring transparency and monitoring. Corruption was reported by the households or elected leaders in the release of assistance in many places (Assam, Bihar, and TN).

For monitoring at the VP level, different systems have been put in place. The most common method is the system of construction of the house by the beneficiary household as suggested by the guideline. Though this seems to have helped in proper utilization of assistance in some cases, there are also situations where this does not seem to have worked effectively. In Assam, now to ensure proper utilization of assistance at the household level, JE at block level has been made a joint signatory of the beneficiary’s account. While the officials have generally welcomed the idea, PRI representatives have opposed it as it leads to excessive bureaucratic intervention to the neglect of VPs.

In all states the funds are being released to households in two to four instalments. Except in Bihar and to some extent in Assam, the fund release is dependent upon the progress achieved by household. VPs monitor the progress with the help of their own staff. In a few cases, staff from block level helps VPs (Rajasthan and MP) in monitoring. In Bihar it is now mandatory to release the second instalment of assistance within 60 days of the first release irrespective of the progress. The state government has introduced the system in order to reduce the hassles faced by households in getting the second instalment. In Assam, it was reported that the second instalment is to be released before March end so that funds do not lapse as a result of which it is felt that the progress in construction is found to be low or slow.

Conclusion

Overall, by design IAY is a highly structured and standardised programme. The scope for PRIs to play a more proactive role is very limited. How far PRIs have been able to play their due role depends upon the nature of devolution. Largely, IAY is being implemented by bureaucratic agencies. At the district level the role of ZP is also dependent upon the status of DRDA. In states where DRDAs exist as parallel institutions, the role of ZP has been curtailed. About IPs, again because of the nature of the programme the role is largely perfunctory. The elected body was found having hardly any role in planning. However, the administrative and technical staffs like BDO/TDO and engineers in most states are found playing key role in activities like releasing funds, providing technical support, and certifying the progress of house construction. It is here that they tend to dominate over elected representatives which also give a scope for rent-seeking.

It is the VPs which have a more prominent role in actual planning and implementation of the scheme. VPs, given their closeness to households, are found playing a proactive role to ensure that to the extent possible the needy get the assistance given limited allotment. Wherever such prioritisation has happened it has been done mostly with the involvement of gramsabha. However, VPs in some cases have also shown favour or bias. Regarding the involvement of VPs in releasing funds, the scenario is mixed. But wherever the VPs release the funds, they are found actively involved in monitoring the progress of house construction.

To conclude, the involvement of PRIs in IAY is conditioned by the guidelines, the extent of devolution attempted by the states, and the emerging local experience with various aspects of programme implementation. The IAY experience reveals that the PRIs’ involvement is being approached more in an instrumental than in an integrated manner. As a result neither the goal of improving the grassroots delivery of CSS nor the cause of empowering panchayats is being fully addressed.
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1. Professor, Institute of Rural Management, Anand Email- hss@irma.ac.in
2. Research Associate, Institute of Rural Management, Anand E-mail:
shriprakashsingh.rajput@gmail.com